Three Noor Missiles at One Destroyer in the Strait – The Third One Came From a Wadi That Wasn’t in..
In the early hours of a tense morning in the Strait of Hormuz, the USS Gonzalez found itself in a precarious situation as three Noor missiles were launched at the destroyer.
The first missile cleared the Iranian coastal ridge at 6:11 a.m., and the ship’s Aegis system quickly acquired a firing solution.
This encounter was not just a routine engagement; it was a well-coordinated attack designed to exploit the narrowest part of the Strait, where maneuverability is severely restricted.
The USS Gonzalez, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer weighing 9,100 tons, was assigned the lead position in a surface action group transiting the strait.
Being in the lead position meant that the Gonzalez had the best air defense capabilities but also faced the highest risk as it navigated through the narrow channel.

At the time of the first missile launch, the Gonzalez had already been in the narrowest section of the strait for 11 minutes.
With only 3.2 nautical miles of navigable water on either side and commercial traffic further constraining its maneuvering options, the tactical geometry was as challenging as it gets.
The ship could not turn north due to the Iranian coastline, nor could it turn south without cutting across the outbound shipping lane filled with tanker traffic.
As the first Noor missile was launched, the Aegis SPY-1D radar system was already in active search mode.
The threat alert for the missile came from the radar, which detected the fire control radar activation 23 seconds before the missile launch.
Within just three seconds of the missile clearing the ridge, the Gonzalez’s crew was aware of the incoming threat.
The second Noor missile was launched 11 seconds after the first, and it came from a different battery positioned 14 nautical miles to the east.
The two missiles approached the Gonzalez on crossing vectors, a tactic designed to complicate the defense response.
The tactical geometry of the situation was reminiscent of previous engagements, where Iranian coastal defense batteries had successfully utilized similar strategies.
By the time the Gonzalez was engaged, the fleet’s guidance for Hormuz transits had already been updated to include SM-6 missiles specifically for intercepting crossing angle threats.
The Gonzalez was equipped with SM-6 in 12 of its cells, and the crew allocated the SM-2 Block IIIA to the first Noor missile on a favorable head-on trajectory.
As the first two missiles were engaged, a third missile launched from a concealed position in a wadi, a dry riverbed that provided cover from radar detection.
This third missile was not accounted for in pre-transit intelligence, as the wadi position had been established only the night before, making it a tactical complication that the Gonzalez had not anticipated.
When the third missile appeared on the radar, it had already been in flight for 64 seconds, closing in rapidly on the ship.
The crew was managing two active intercepts when this new threat emerged, requiring immediate action.
The weapons allocation officer quickly calculated a firing solution for the SM-6 missile, which was launched just 10 seconds after the third contact was detected.
The first engagement concluded successfully, with the SM-2 intercepting the first Noor missile at a range of 22.1 nautical miles.
The second engagement also resulted in a successful interception by the SM-6, which destroyed the second Noor missile at 17.3 nautical miles.

However, the third missile posed a more significant challenge, having had 74 seconds of undetected flight time before the crew could respond.
The SM-6 missile achieved acquisition at 6:12:31 a.m., and the intercept solution was executed.
The missile detonated at 6:12:51 a.m., but the explosion occurred 280 meters off the Gonzalez’s port bow.
While the missile was partially neutralized, the warhead still detonated, sending a massive column of water 60 feet high over the forward deck of the destroyer.
Fortunately, there was no damage to the ship or injuries to the crew, but the close call highlighted the dangers of operating in such confined waters.
The USS Gonzalez continued its transit through the Strait of Hormuz, as stopping in a narrow channel would have posed significant risks.

The formation behind the Gonzalez, including the cruiser USS Hugh City and two additional destroyers, was just 3.5 nautical miles behind, maintaining a speed of 16 knots.
As the engagement data was relayed to Central Command, the intelligence picture was updated to reflect the three launch positions.
The Wadi position was geolocated based on radar emissions, and authorization to engage was received shortly after the incident.
The subsequent airstrike on the two known battery positions was successful, destroying both vehicles and their ammunition.
However, the concealed wadi position presented a unique challenge for targeting aircraft due to the terrain features that obstructed direct approaches.
The pilots had to adjust their targeting profiles to ensure successful strikes on the hidden launcher.

The incident revealed a significant shift in Iranian tactics, utilizing terrain features for concealment and making it harder for intelligence to detect potential threats.
The wadi position was not in the pre-transit database, and the lack of awareness about such concealed threats underscored the need for improved intelligence collection methods.
In the aftermath of the engagement, the Navy updated its protocols to enhance communication with commercial traffic in the Strait.
The Gonzalez transmitted a “secure it” call to warn vessels of debris in the shipping lane, but the message came too late for some ships in the area.
Moving forward, it was recommended that such communications be made immediately upon the onset of hostilities to ensure the safety of commercial vessels navigating the strait.

The successful defense against the missile threat was largely attributed to the performance of the crew, particularly the weapons allocation officer, Lieutenant Junior Grade Marcus Chen.
His ability to manage multiple threat tracks simultaneously and prepare intercept solutions without waiting for explicit orders was recognized as a decisive factor in preventing a direct hit on the Gonzalez.
Ultimately, the engagement was a stark reminder of the challenges faced by naval forces in the Strait of Hormuz, where commercial traffic and military operations intersect in a high-stakes environment.
The continuous flow of oil through this vital waterway remained unaffected, as the operational definition of freedom of navigation was maintained, albeit under precarious conditions.
As the USS Gonzalez and its formation completed their transit, the lessons learned from this engagement were disseminated across the fleet, emphasizing the importance of vigilance, adaptability, and effective communication in ensuring the safety and security of naval operations in one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints.
